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e x e c u T i v e  s u m m a r y 
Following the dramatic electoral changes in Hungary in 2010 that witnessed the strengthening of the 
centre- and far right parties and the demise of the left, an important shift in public discourses on tolerance 
and acceptance has occurred. The ‘Nation’ now occupies a central role in the governing Fidesz’s vision of 
legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly 
and explicitly identifies who belongs, and who, by extension does not belong, to the ‘Nation’. Ethnic 
Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighboring countries are included in Fidesz’s conception 
of the ‘Hungarian Nation’ (reflected most prominently in the extension of dual citizenship to them). 
Hungary’s Roma minority, on the other hand, features increasingly prominently (particularly in far-
right but also centre-right discourse) as the primary ‘Other’ against which the ‘Nation’ is constituted. 
Whilst the boundaries of national inclusion extended beyond the political borders of the country, the 
boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political borders. This was an 
ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.
These recent developments reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary’s political history of national 
inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part 
due to their resonance with earlier iterations of Hungarians nationalism. The ‘Nation’ has figured 
prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half to describe and 
explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. 
In order to better understand in the impact of this most recent resurgence in Hungarian nationalism 
on discourses and practices of tolerance, we explain in our report how the question of Hungary’s 
internal minorities (and the Roma in particular) has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder 
Hungarians. The result is that in certain respect the search for solutions to the Roma problem in 
Hungary is still in its infancy. For years, Hungary’s policies toward its minorities were driven, at least 
in part, by concern for (and a preoccupation with) the transborder Hungarians: Hungary used its 
domestic policies in an attempt to set an example for the neighboring countries to adopt in their 
treatment of the transborder Hungarians. The policies thus devised for Hungary’s minorities and the 
Roma in particular did not always correspond to the needs or demands of these minorities. Legislative 
changes in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have often had the effect of further 
marginalizing the Roma. This continued socio-economic marginalization of the Roma has been further 
exacerbated by racialised understandings of difference (particularly evident vis-à-vis the Roma) that 
preclude possibilities for socio-cultural integration and/or accommodation. The major tolerance issues 
in Hungary today are overwhelmingly related to the situation of the Roma. 
The History of Toleration and Exclusion in Hungary: The Roma, National Minorities, and 
Immigrants
Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice 
and racism in Hungary. The extreme right have recently turned their attention to the Roma not with 
the aim of ameliorating tensions but rather aggravating them by scapegoating the Roma. This has had 
the effect of legitimating the continued radicalization of more mainstream discourses on the Roma. 
Anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be understood more generally as a ‘cultural code’ shared to 
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varying degrees in all political discourse and indeed more generally at a societal level as well, regardless 
of ideological orientation. The Roma thus are understood across the political responsible as being 
connected to or indeed at the root of a wide variety of social, political, and economic problems in 
Hungary.
Immigrants in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed with a 
combination of fear and distrust. The largest group of immigrants to Hungary are Hungarians from 
the neighboring countries. Despite the fact that in political discourse these Hungarians constitute 
an important part of the national ‘self ’, in and through the practices of immigration they have been 
constituted as, somewhat ironically, a national ‘other’. Other immigrant groups in contrast have been 
less visible simply due to their small numbers. But when these groups do appear in the media, they too 
are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic.
The report elaborates on these two main types of groups: indigenous groups and immigrants. 
Indigenous groups include the country’s national minorities, Jews and the Roma; immigrant groups 
include the transborder Hungarian immigrants and other (mostly non-European) immigrants. 
Individually and collectively these various groups constitute only a small portion of the Hungarian 
population. About 4% of the population belong to one of the officially recognized12 national minority 
groups, though there numbers have been declining in recent years. At the same time the Roma minority 
has at least doubled over the last forty years to an estimated 400,000-800,000 at present. The national 
minorities and Roma enjoy official legal recognition. The Jewish population, in contrast, s estimated 
at around 80,000-200,000, is not afforded official recognition as a minority group. The proportion of 
immigrants in Hungary is even lower and one of the lowest in Europe, at about 2% of the population, 
with about two-thirds of these immigrants being ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries.
The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities. 
The Law officially recognized (and institutionally accommodated) cultural and ethnic difference. The 
cultural autonomy the law afforded to Hungary’s minorities, however, was in large part symbolic for 
most of the national minority groups given their relatively small numbers and their strong assimilation 
tendencies. As for the Roma, the law contributed little to resolving the harsh social, cultural and 
economic problems they experienced. Jewish activists for their part did not seek official recognition and 
therefore Jews were not named in the law. Nor did the law address immigrant groups, although another 
1993 law, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, decreed restrictive paths to naturalization (with some 
benefits for ethnic Hungarians).
The most pressing issues surrounding tolerance in Hungary concern the Roma. Rates of Roma 
unemployment were above 75% in 2005; their poverty rate is five-ten times higher that of the majority 
population, doubling over the last ten years; and neighborhood and school segregation further 
exacerbate their marginalization. Discrimination against the Roma has been increasing in spheres of 
employment, healthcare, and law enforcement. Life expectancy for the Roma is seven years below the 
national average.  
Roma political mobilisation and activism has been unable to reverse these trends. Roma minority 
self-governments and political parties were formed after the 1993 law, but without significant power. 
The ‘Roma issue’ unquestionably remains the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary today. 
Other minorities in Hungary are not viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian 
nation. They therefore to not present similar problems related to toleration. In contrast, anti-
Semitism has been (and continues to be) an essential and formative element of Hungarian national 
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self-understandings, with ‘the Jew’ having fill the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. “The Jewish 
question” has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be connected to broader 
issues of tolerance. About 10% of the population hold radical anti-Semitic views ( still well below rates 
for those views expressed in relation to the Roma).Immigrant groups are also viewed with distrust 
(despite their low numbers), but again not to the same degree as the Roma.
The Roma minority therefore suffers from the greatest intolerance: 50-80% of the population 
(including those holding views from both sides of the political spectrum) display negative attitudes 
towards the Roma. These negative tendencies have been exacerbated in recent years by the rise of 
the radical right. . The exclusion of the Roma is deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday 
practices. Studies on discrimination against the Roma in the labor market, schools, law enforcement, 
and state welfare point to the failure of policy at both macro and micro levels. Many experts argue that 
an ethnicized Roma underclass has taken shape in recent years in Hungary. These experts acknowledge 
the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation in dealing with this problem, 
but at the same time they argue that the problems facing the Roma minority also should be addressed 
through the policies of social inclusion.
Concluding remarks
Although rarely successful, Hungarian elites have made some significant efforts over the past three 
decades to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other 
international organisations. Further changes have been brought about since Hungary’s formal accession 
to the European Union in 2004, contributing to the rise of a policy discourse on toleration/acceptance. 
These changes have also importantly been accompanied by the new availability of financial resources, 
part of which have reached the targeted minorities and contributed to the improvement of certain 
aspects of their lives (e.g., a slight decline in school segregation in some districts, and the improved 
treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while the EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these 
and other regards, the accession process has also somewhat paradoxically provided new opportunity 
structures for nationalists and right-wing radical groups to pursue discourses and policies of intolerance 
towards ethnic and religious groups. This is what is occurring now with the Roma in Hungary. The 
Roma will therefore be the main focus of our further research into issues of tolerance and acceptance 
in Hungary.
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Transborder Hungarians
d e f i n i T i o n s
The 1993 Law on National and Ethnic minorities: a law granting cultural autonomy to thirteen 
national and ethnic minorities (the Roma being the only ‘ethnic minority’) allowing them to form 
self-governments at the local and national levels to deal with cultural matters in order to nurture and 
maintain their distinctive identities. 
“Gypsy criminality”: a term used by the police in their record keeping during the communist years. 
The term was discredited following the regime change but has recently enjoyed renewed circulation 
with the recent rise of the radical right.  
Dual citizenship Law: a law (2010) aimed at transborder Hungarians to make it easier for them to 
claim Hungarian citizenship. 
Status Law: package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included measures to promote 
Hungarian culture in the neighboring countries and the legal right for transborder Hungarians to work 
in Hungary.
Transborder Hungarians: ethnic Hungarians living in the countries bordering Hungary. According 
to nationalist discourse they never ceased being members of the Hungarian nation. 
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1 .  i n T r o d u c T i o n
The 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections made it onto the front page of many international 
newspapers. Although most papers reported on the electoral success of the radical right-wing political 
party, Jobbik, at the same time another, arguably more important, development had occurred in 
Hungarian electoral politics that led to the restructuring of the entire Hungarian political landscape. The 
previously governing Hungarian Socialist Party was unseated (capturing only a couple more percentage 
points of the vote than Jobbik), while the Fidesz-KDNP coalition (the centre-right Hungarian Civic 
Union-Christian Democratic People’s Party,1 hereinafter simply ‘Fidesz’) received enough votes to 
secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, making it possible for them to pass legislation (or even 
change the constitution) without support from the opposition. The new government made it clear that 
they saw their victory as a “two-thirds revolution”2 reflecting the will of the “Hungarian nation”. Thus, 
as the new Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared, Fidesz formed a “Government of National Causes” 
which would not shy away from using its constitutional majority “to demolish taboos”. They intended 
to push their own legislation through parliament and to rewrite the Hungarian Constitution to reflect 
“the moral system of the new Framework for National Cooperation”3.
The ‘nation’ played a central role in Fidesz’s vision of legislative and constitutional reform for 
Hungary. Through its national discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identified who 
belonged, and who, by extension did not, to the nation. Ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary 
in the neighboring countries were included (and not only symbolically) in Fidesz’s conception of the 
‘Hungarian Nation’. This was reflected in the institution of dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians, 
one of the first laws passed by the new parliament. The new law removed residency requirements for 
those speaking Hungarian and claiming Hungarian ancestry. In effect, this meant that the 2.5 million 
ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries were now eligible for Hungarian citizenship. In his 
‘one-hundred day’ speech Orbán made it clear that these transborder Hungarians were now ‘reunited’ 
with the ‘Nation’.4
At the same time, boundaries of exclusion from the ‘Nation’ were also being redrawn at the level 
of discourse and in some cases policies as well. The Roma minority, which had featured prominently in 
the 2010 elections as the primary ‘Other’ against which the ‘Nation’ was constructed, clearly did not 
fit in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Nation’. A series of laws were passed that directly or indirectly targeted 
the Roma ‘problem’: tougher measures on petty crime were introduced; school behaviour of children 
deemed violent was to be more strictly punished; it again became possible to fail students, thus forcing 
them to repeat the school year even if they were only in the first grade; and actions seen as ‘welfare 
delinquencies’ were criminalized. Although none of these changes named the Roma explicitly (to the 
1 The KDNP is a small party that would not have obtained enough votes in 2010 to enter parliament without the support of 
Fidesz. The last time the KDNP won seats on its own was in 1994. After the party fell apart in 1997, many of the party’s MPs 
joined the Fidesz fraction in the parliament. Former KDNP members joined Fidesz lists in 1998 in elections that saw Fidesz 
ultimately form a government. KDNP subsequently reformed and the two parties formed an official alliance in 2005, a year 
before the 2006 parliamentary elections (in which they lost out to the Socialists).
2 Prime Minister Orbán, evaluating the first 100 days of his government’s work, in a speech at the ‘Professzorok Batthyány Köre’ 
on September 4, 2010.
3 Ibid.
4 Prime Minister Orbán on September 4, 2010.
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contrary, Fidesz repeatedly invoked an anti-discrimination discourse citing ‘dignity for all’5) it is clear 
that the Roma were disproportionately affected by these measures.
Orbán thus clearly demarcated the boundaries of the ‘Nation’. Transborder Hungarians were 
referred to as ‘co-nationals’ (nemzettársak) or ‘Hungarian people’ (magyar emberek), and Roma were 
‘our fellow citizens’ (állampolgárok) or ‘our compatriots’ (polgártársak). Other ’markers’ also conveyed 
and constructed difference: ’Gypsy ethnic origin’ (cigányszármazás), ’skin colour’ (bőrszín), ‘citizens 
belonging to the Roma minority’ (Roma kisebbséghez tartozó állampolgárok) were often used in relation 
to criminality, social welfare delinquencies, or school violence.6 Government officials emphasized the 
fact that they had to take action against such crimes in order to protect Hungarians, whose interests 
had been neglected by the previous government. The irony of this situation is that while the boundaries 
of national inclusion were extended beyond the political borders of the country, the boundaries of 
national difference were constructed within those same political boundaries. This was an ethnic (or 
ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.
These inclusionary and exclusionary discourses were diluted versions of similar discourses 
preferred and proffered by the right-wing party Jobbik. Indeed, the governing party, Fidesz, operated 
in a symbiotic if ultimately silent relationship with Jobbik. When it suited them, Fidesz, could draw 
clear boundaries to distinguish them and Jobbik, identifying in the process what was unacceptable 
and what was not. On other occasions, Jobbik became the unofficial spokesperson for Fidesz, saying 
explicitly what Fidesz dare not say even implicitly, thus blurring the lines between politically correct 
and stigmatizing discourses
The dramatic electoral changes taking place in the spring of 2010 reflect only the latest chapter in 
Hungary’s political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now 
enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their lineage through previous generations of Hungarian 
politics. The status of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries has been a perennial topic of public 
debate on the nation on and off for the last century. All post-communist governments of varying political 
stripes have made the transborder Hungarian question central to their political agenda. The question 
of Hungary’s internal minorities has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. 
In many ways, Hungary’s policies on internal minorities can even be said to have been driven by the 
political elite’s preoccupation with the transborder Hungarians:  Hungary has used its domestic policies 
to set the example for minority politics which the neighbouring countries have been meant to follow in 
their treatment of Hungarians. But the policies they have devised for Hungary’s minorities in general 
and the Roma in particular have provided administrative structures that do not always meet their needs. 
Legislative changes that were introduced in education, the welfare system, and economic structures 
have had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. The key difference now with the rise of Fidesz 
has been the party’s ability to implement policies unencumbered by political opposition.
Our report on tolerance will focus its attention on these two groups: the transborder Hungarians 
and the Roma. We will sketch out the position of other groups in Hungary in both historical and 
demographic context, but our main focus will be on these two groups that have also received historically 
the main focus in Hungarian political, cultural, and social life.
5 See for example the ‘one-hundred day’ speech of Orbán on September 2, 2010 (http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=152748), 
or his parliamentary address on ‘Roma criminality’, September 13, 2010 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0x3bjN7wUCk).
6 Ibid.; see also some of Orbán’s declarations during the electoral campaign: 
(http://www.nol.hu/belfold/Orbán_viktor__ciganybunozes_nincs__ciganybunozok_vannak).
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2 .  n aT i o n a l  i d e n T i T y  a n d  s TaT e  f o r m aT i o n  i n  H u n g a r y
The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and 
a half as an all-encompassing framework to explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. The 
‘nation’ has even overshadowed to a certain extent traditional left-right political cleavages in various 
east European contexts (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010; Palonen, 2009). In order to better appreciate this 
resurgence of the ‘Nation’ in Hungarian political and public thought, as well as its effects on the public’s 
perceptions of what ‘being Hungarian’ means, we will look at, first, how Hungarian national identity 
has been historically constituted, and, second, changing popular understanding of Hungarian national 
identity. In both cases our interest is in how both political and public space has been ‘nationalized’ and 
the implications of these developments for both inclusion and exclusion.
2.1. Understandings of the ‘Nation’ in Hungary
Political debates on questions related to definitions of the ‘Hungarian nation’ began in Hungary in the 
19th century and have continued with varying degrees of intensity and with periodically shifting ‘Other-
figures’ to the present day. The debates wavered between ethno-cultural and civic-political conceptions 
of Hungarian nationhood. These competing conceptions were applied differently to Hungary’s 
changing landscape of minority politics. Until 1918 the minority question concerned those non-ethnic 
Hungarians living within the borders of the Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After 
World War I and the loss of territory it entailed, the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in the 
newly constituted or transformed neighbouring countries became the main national minority issue. 
Then as now, the relationship between internal (non-Hungarian) and external (Hungarian) minorities 
was viewed as two sides of the same coin: how can Hungary adequately address the issue of its internal 
minorities without harming the interests of ethnic Hungarians living outside the national borders.
Different solutions to this problem have been proposed at different historical junctures. Following 
Hungary’s political reconfiguration at the conclusion of WWI, the ruling classes “perceived the main 
danger as the threat to the existence of what remained of the state of Hungary”, overshadowing their 
concerns for the Hungarian minority abroad (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). During the years of the Cold War 
stability “Hungarian statehood – even if not independence – seemed fairly secure. Thus, the anxiety 
for the Hungarians outside of Hungary, for their capacity to resist oppression and forced assimilation, 
became the main preoccupation of the new populists” (Kis, 2002a, p. 234). This distinction led to 
different policy strategies and outcomes: while the ruling classes sought out alliances in the interwar 
period to help bolster Hungarian statehood and regain the lost territories, by the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the Hungarian minorities of the neighboring countries were ‘rediscovered’ and their existence 
raised political questions for Hungary, the new populists had to depart from the old nationalism and 
form alliances with western powers embracing the discourse of human rights and minority rights.
Things changed again following the collapse of communism when Europe emerged as a key 
political actor, “offer[ing] a set of international standards, including provisions on minority rights, 
in terms of which conflict resolution could be sought” (Kis, 2002a, p. 236). This new generation of 
Hungarian nationalists thus had to ‘learn’ this new rights-discourse if they wanted to be accepted in 
European politics. The ensuing debate has
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“reveal[ed] a deeper disagreement between the nationalist and non-nationalist 
understandings of the policy of minority rights. For non-nationalists, the commitment 
for such a policy is a matter of principle, a consequence of their more general commitment 
to freedom, equality, and individual dignity. Nationalists, on the other hand, adopt 
the rights-discourse as a matter of tactical accommodation to a status quo, not as a 
framework for principled settlement” (Kis, 2002a, p. 238). 
Nationalists thus, argues Kis, fail both the universalization test (anti-Semitism and indifference 
for the plight of the Roma are common in these groups) and the human-rights test (they treat individual 
human rights with neglect and contempt).
2.1.1. Hungarian national identity and some of its external “Others”
Hungary has defined itself not only vis-à-vis internal minorities (the Roma) and external neighbours, 
but also vis-à-vis Europe. After World War II, when leading public figures were expected to legitimize 
the “sovietization” of Hungary and the neighbouring countries (Bariska & Pallai, 2005), there was 
little room for open debate on questions of national identity. In this new context, the ‘reactionary 
forces of the ancien regime constituted the ‘internal Other’; at the same time the “people of the East” 
became part of the ‘self ’ in a new homogeneous and homogenising version of Eastern Europe,. This 
was an attempt to ideologically and historically justify the geo-political division of Europe, a political 
reality that emerged after Yalta. Similarities among the nations of Eastern-Europe were frequently 
stressed, and common roots in their history, literature, and culture were highlighted by literary critics, 
musicologists, ethnographers, and historians. 
These state-driven, top-down identity construction programs ultimately contributed to the 
appearance of a counter-debate, led by historians, about the characteristics of Hungarian national 
identity and Hungary’s position in Europe. Starting in the 1960s a new generation of Hungarian 
historians began to reframe the “Europe debate”, many of them with the aim of differentiating Hungary 
and its neighboring countries – “Central Europe” – from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus 
repositioning the region on the mental and geographical map of the continent (Pach, 1963, 1968; 
Berend – Ranki, 1968, 1969; Szucs, 1981; Berend 1982, 1985; Hanak, 1988). Beginning in the early 
1970s, more and more academics argued that a sharp line cut through Eastern Europe where the 
western parts of this region – especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – were more developed 
and thus more similar to Western Europe. However, it was not until the early 1980s that a Hungarian 
historian, Jeno Szucs, openly claimed that Europe was divided into three parts – the West, the East, 
and the in-between region of Central-Eastern-Europe. He argued that each of these three regions had 
a different path of development (Szűcs, 1981). 
By the 1980s this debate evolved into a more general dispute about the existence and essence of a 
“Central” Europe, with well known intellectuals from all around Europe chiming in (Milan Kundera, 
Czeslaw Milosz, Eugene Ionesco, Danilo Kis, Gyorgy Konrad, Timothy Garton Ash and others). This 
debate centred on the degree to which a shared Central-European culture and mentality could be said 
to exist.  These debates carried into the 1990s, trickling down ever more into public consciousness 
and public opinion, leading ultimately to the rediscovery of the Hungarians that lived as minorities in 
the neighbouring countries. Csepeli (1989) argues that at the start of late 1970s Hungarian national 
identity began a process of reinventing itself. Part of this can be explained by an emergence in a 
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“world-wide demand for a reformulation of national identity”, but the more particular reasons were the 
worsening condition of Hungarians living outside Hungary: “consequently, beginning in the second half 
of the 1970s, an outwardly directed aspect of the national question emerged in Hungary” – argues Csepeli 
(1989). In surveys conducted in the 1980s a significant number of Hungary’s population (57%) said that 
“there were countries in Hungary’s vicinity which discriminate against Hungarians who live there” and they 
thought that the Hungarian state should support and help these groups of Hungarians living outside of 
Hungary. However, it was only a minority of the respondents which said that, if it became necessary, 
Hungary should not avoid clashes with its neighbours (23%), while an even smaller proportion (7%) 
thought that there was nothing objectionable “to the Hungarian government’s extortion of its neighbours 
through the limitation of domestic minority group’s rights.” (1989)
This shift in focus by the early 1990s led to the re-emergence of some of the neighbouring states 
and nationalities as Hungary’s dominant ‘external Others’, thus undoing completely any notion 
of ‘relatedness’ among ‘the people of the East’ that had been constructed and legitimated during 
Communism.
2.2. Attitude surveys on Hungarian national identity
Surveys from recent decades reveal ambiguity over popular understandings of Hungarianness. 
Research from the 1980s showed that political vacillation between ethno-cultural and civic-political 
understandings of nationhood was reflected in popular confusion over Hungarian national identity 
(Csepeli, 1989). On the one hand, the communist state promoted a civic-political understanding of 
identity where all individuals, irrespective of their background, were equal citizens. On the other 
hand, in its everyday practices the same state placed pressure on minority groups to assimilate into a 
‘homogenous nation’. This was further complicated by the fact that the majority population resisted the 
assimilation of certain minority groups, especially that of the Roma. Attempts at ‘integration’ were thus 
viewed as imposed cultural and lifestyle practices that were deemed desirable for the Roma by members 
of the majority society (e.g., the forced washing and haircutting campaigns to ‘civilize’ the Roma in the 
1960s, as described by Stewart, 1989; Bernath and Polyak, 2001).
National identity is understood in Hungary as elsewhere as an ascribed identity, one that it is given 
at birth (and therefore one that is not achieved). The assimilation of the Roma was thus inconceivable 
simply because the Roma were ascribed “a separate minority identity which took into account primarily 
origin and outward appearance. That made it impossible, even in theory, for a change in ‘national’ 
character to occur” (Csepeli, 1989; Hann, 1990).
In the 1990s there was a greater ambivalence in relation to these civic-political and ethno-cultural 
understandings of national identity. On the one hand, human rights, tolerance, and rational discourse 
were seen as dominant components of the national character; on the other hand, ethnocentrism and 
intolerance towards foreigners were part of the same national identity. These latter components were 
remnants of the long history of the ‘culture-nation’ rhetoric of Hungary and could be best understood 
by using Habermas’ concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’: people living in developed welfare states were 
aware of the set of privileges they benefited from, and, fearing the loss of those privileges, they developed 
feelings of ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners (Csepeli, 1997; Csepeli et al., 1999).
More recently culture-nation conceptions of Hungarianness have been resurgent. This is manifest 
in the lately declining negative attitudes towards foreigners (xenophobia) and the increasing prejudice, 
rejection, and negative attitudes towards internal minorities (mainly the Roma). This is accompanied 
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by claims of cultural supremacy and the rejection of ‘difference’. These trends have been attributed to 
alarmist discourses about the ‘shrinking of the nation’ (nemzetfogyás) which anticipate a rapid aging of 
Hungary’s population. Against this backdrop, foreigners are increasingly expected to undergo complete 
assimilation. This was made easier (at least in theory; see below) by the fact that the largest group 
of immigrants in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries. These groups speak 
Hungarian as mother tongue and share more or less the same cultural codes; as such they are not 
perceived as threatening the ‘Nation’. In contrast, assimilation of internal minorities and especially the 
Roma is viewed as much more problematic: a separate ethnicised and sometimes racialized identity 
is ascribed to the group, based mainly on origin and outward appearance, which makes assimilation 
unimaginable.
Nationalism and ethnocentrism has been consistently high among Hungary’s population since the 
1990s (Csepeli et al., 2004; Örkény, 2006). During this same time significant changes have occurred 
not so much in the degree of nationalism but in its content and in the socio-economic background 
of those who support it. In the mid 1990s, the demographic profile of nationalists was older and low 
social status; ten years later this demographic profile dissipated and only value preferences correlate 
with nationalist attitudes (Csepeli et al., 2004). At the same time, ethno-cultural understandings of 
the nation have enjoyed a political revival. This has contributed to a slight decrease in xenophobia 
and rejection of foreigners but also a significant increase in prejudice and intolerance against internal 
minority groups, namely the Roma.
3 .  c u lT u r a l  d i v e r s i T y  c H a l l e n g e s  d u r i n g  T H e  l a s T  3 0  y e a r s
In this section we identify minority groups in Hungary and account for their ‘difference’. We summarize 
the most important demographic features of these groups and briefly outline their histories with a focus on 
questions of toleration and/or exclusion. We also explore how well ‘toleration’ captures the circumstances 
of these groups in the larger political and social contexts in which they are embedded. Whilst we provide 
a general overview of all major minority groups in Hungary, our focus in this report will be on the Roma 
(as our ‘indigenous’ minority) and transborder Hungarians (as our ‘immigrant’ group).
The most significant tolerance issues in Hungary today are related to the situation of the Roma. 
Their ‘otherness’ has been constructed differently from other groups for a variety of complex historical 
and social reasons. At present, Roma are the target of the most intense xenophobia, prejudice, and 
racism in Hungary. Historically, it was Jews who were seen as the primary internal other against which 
the national ‘self ’ was understood; now it’s the Roma who fill this role. This is due in part to the rise of 
the extreme right who have turned new (and negative) attention on the Roma, further legitimating the 
radicalization of more mainstream discourses in the process. But the extreme right is both cause and 
consequence of this: anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be viewed more generally as a ‘cultural 
code’ shared to varying degrees and with different interpretation in all political discourse and indeed at 
a societal level more generally as well. In different ways, a wide range of political processes contribute 
to the ethnicization of Hungary’s social, political, and economic problems by making a scapegoat of 
the Roma. 
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Immigrants in Hungary, although comparatively small in number, are also typically viewed as 
a fearful ‘other’. This is even the case, somewhat paradoxically, when the ‘other’ in certain contexts 
(namely nationalist political discourse) simultaneously constitutes part of the national ‘self ’. Thus 
ethnic Hungarians arriving in large numbers primarily as labour migrants from the neighboring 
countries since the early 1990s have suffered the humiliations and degradations (often ethnicised) of 
labour migrants elsewhere in the world, in spite of their nominally shared ethnicity. Other immigrant 
groups in contrast have basically remained more invisible due to their small numbers. But when these 
other immigrant groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. 
the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic. 
3.1. Main minority groups in Hungary
We will discuss both indigenous groups and immigrant groups in Hungary. 
The indigenous groups include: 
•	 National minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, 
Greek, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians
•	 Religious minority: Jews
•	 Ethnic minority: Roma
The immigrants include: 
•	 Ethnic Hungarian immigrants from the neighboring countries 
•	 Other (mostly non-European) immigrants
3.1.1. Indigenous groups –demographic picture
Changes in the number of the biggest national and ethnic minority groups, 1949-20017:
Year German Slovak Serb Croat Slovene Romanian Roma
1949 22 455 25 988 5 185 20 123 4 473 14 713
1960 50 765 30 690 4 583 33 014 10 502
1970 35 594 21 176 12 235 14 609 4 205 8 640 325 000
1980 31 231 16 054 20 030 7 139 380 000
1990 30 824 10 459 2 905 13 570 1 930 10 740 142 683
2001 62 233 17 692 3 816 15 620 3 040 7 995 190 046
Sociological 
estimations1
200 000-
220 000
100 000-
110 00 5 000
80 000-
90 000 5 000 25 000
400 000-
800 000
7 The data are from the national census. 
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According to the 2001 census, about 4% of Hungary’s population belong to a national minority 
group. The Roma minority population has at least doubled over the last forty years from an estimated 
200 000 (1967) to 400 000-800 000 (2008).  Censuses in Hungary notoriously undercount Roma who 
are reluctant to self-identify as Roma for fear of persecution.
National minorities
Hungary is home to a number of officially recognized national minorities that together make up about 
8-12% of the population including both the Roma and the national minority groups.  Most officially 
recognized minorities in Hungary are the result of the post World War I efforts to fashion (ethnically 
homogenous) nation states out of previously multi-national empires in the region.  Whilst minorities 
constituted nearly half of the population of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, the post war 
I truncated version of Hungary (with two-thirds less territory and half the population) largely achieved 
its aims of national homogeneity, thus accounting for the modest figures for national minorities that we 
see echoed generations later in contemporary Hungary.  After World War II, the expatriation of a large 
part of the German minority and the population exchange of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary for ethnic 
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the assimilationist politics of the communist regime resulted 
in even further population decrease of national minorities in Hungary.
A. Germans/Swabs
Germans have lived in Hungary since the 17th century when came as settlers. More waves arrived 
throughout the centuries to follow. At the end of World War I, 500 000 Germans lived in Hungary. 
After WWII, in the name of collective guilt, thousands of Germans were either deported to the Soviet 
Union for forced labor (35 000-60 000) or expatriated back to Germany.  During this period, in total 
about 185 000 Germans were deprived of their citizenship and of property and had to leave the country 
for Germany. About 230 000 Germans remained in Hungary.
During the communist regime, the cultural activities of the German minority were very limited. 
In this politically (and ethnically) constrained environment, however, the Alliance of Germans was 
established and officially recognised (1955), thus providing the German intelligencia with an opportunity 
to develop certain literary and fine art activities as well as to engage in research projects on the history, 
linguistic and ethnographic characteristics of the German minority in Hungary. From the early 1980s, 
the Alliance established its first bilingual primary schools. These schools were popular with German 
families, including those who had otherwise been on the path to assimilation.  This contributed to a 
revival of German culture in Hungary, which included the fostering of cultural and economic links 
with various organizations in Western Germany. Today, the German minority (benefitting from the 
1993 Minorities Law) is very active and enjoys a vibrant cultural life in villages and towns where there 
are significant numbers of ethnic Germans.
B. Slovaks 
As in case of the Germans, Slovaks also settled in the historic territory of Hungary in the middle ages 
to fill various gaps in the labour market.   And like the Germans, Hungary’s Slovak population was 
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also subjected to population transfers following the conclusion of World War II.  At this time nearly 
half a million Slovaks lived in Hungary and a million Hungarians lived in Slovakia.  The population 
exchange affected a much smaller proportion (but nevertheless very significant) of the two groups: 
76,000 Hungarians move to Hungary from Slovakia, and 60,000 Slovaks moved from Hungary to 
Slovakia. Today, there are still villages and towns in Hungary where half of the population declares 
themselves Slovak. In these places there are minority self-governments which organize local cultural 
life. Like the Germans, the Slovaks have also been beneficiaries of the 1993 Law on Minorities. Slovaks 
thus have been bouncing back from the post World War II population transfers with Czechoslovakia 
which had attempted (unsuccessfully) to tidy up a messy national minority picture.
C. Other national minorities: Greeks/Bulgarians/Croats/Serbs/Slovenes/ Ruthenians/
Ukrainians/Poles/Armenians/Romanians 
The number of ‘other national minorities’ in Hungary (including Greeks, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, 
Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and Romanians) totals altogether around 40,000 (with 
nearly three-quarters of those being either Croatian, Romanian, or Ukrainian).
Hungary’s Law on Minorities granted all of these groups a degree of cultural autonomy that has 
contributed to the their revival (though this especially true for the biggest of these groups, the Germans 
and Slovaks). This cultural autonomy, however, is in large part symbolic.  Given the relatively small 
number of these groups together with the degree of their assimilation, none are viewed as a challenge to 
the hegemony of the Hungarian nation or as groups that present problems related to toleration today. 
D. Jews8
The Jewish population is estimated to be around 80 000 – 200 000 in today’s Hungary. At the 
beginning of the 19th century this population was rather small, consisting of mainly wealthy families 
living in urban areas. From the 1830s onwards, new migrants (mostly from poor rural backgrounds 
and Yiddish speaking) started to arrive from Galicia and Russia. By the turn of the century Jews 
made up 4% of Hungary’s population. The liberal and open political atmosphere of the time, however, 
contributed to a significant degree of assimilation among these Jews. The political emancipation of Jews 
took place in 1867 and in 1895 the Jewish religion was given the same legal status as other religions, 
thus effectively legalizing mixed marriages between Jews and Christians. Hungarian Jews turned 
increasingly to Hungarian culture and Hungarian even became the language of religious practices. 
The Jewish population, especially in towns, mixed with the rest of the population.  Intermarriage and 
conversion provided further paths of assimilation. These trends continued relatively unabated until 
1882 and the ‘Tiszaeszlár trial’ in which members of a Jewish community were accused of killing a 
Christian girl for her blood to drink at Pesach. Whilst the accusations were ultimately dropped, the trial 
signaled a new era in the rise of anti-Semitism in Hungary.
A new era in anti-Semitism began following the end of World War I. The political shock owing to 
the loss of territories and population led to the dominance of an irredentist political ideology that went 
hand-in-hand with (and indeed fueled) the rise of anti-Semitism. In 1920 the Hungarian government 
8 Jews are neither a national, ethnic nor a religious minority from an official point of view; rather Jewish is (officially) a religious 
denomination on the one hand, and a cultural community (unofficially, sociologically) on the other hand.
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passed the first ‘numerus clauses’ law, placing caps on the number of Jews who could be admitted to 
university. Further laws followed culminating in the late 1930s with severe restrictions placed on the 
Jews’ basic rights of citizenship. With the outbreak of World War II, Jews were moved to ghettos 
before they were eventually deported with the German occupation in 1944.  In the span of a couple of 
months about 600 000 people (70% of Hungary’s Jewish population at the time, most of them from 
the countryside) were deported to the death camps and killed. The majority of the Budapest Jews (in 
the ghettos), however, survived.
After the end of the war a segment of the surviving Jewish population left the country for the 
US and Israel. Many of those who stayed behind in Hungary joined the Communist Party. Jews also 
participated in the 1956 revolution, but because Rákosi, the previous dictator, was well-known for 
his Jewish origins, whose Jewish origin was well-known, anti-Semitism rose as a result during the 
revolutionary period.  The revolution was oppressed and thirty years of soft communism followed (the 
Kádár-regime, 1956-1989). But this soft communism was not soft for national or religious minorities, 
who by the 1960s were being subjected to policies of assimilation and religious persecution. The National 
Church Office controlled all churches and let them function only under surveillance. Practicing one’s 
religion was risky and demanded lots of personal devotion. The majority of Budapest Jews were already 
strongly assimilated before the war and this tendency continued in the Kádár era. 
The regime change in 1989/1990 brought about a Jewish revival. Zionist organizations, cultural and 
civil organizations, and Jewish educational institutions were all established and many Jews, especially the 
younger generations, discovered a new interest in their previously lost and forgotten cultural and religious 
traditions. Second and third generation Jews, often from mixed marriages, began to organize themselves. 
Today, there is a vivid Jewish cultural life in Budapest. Despite some debate on the matter, most Jewish 
leaders did not make demands for official recognition in the 1993 Minorities Law. During this same time, 
however, anti-Semitism has also been on the rise. Surveys reveal that about 10% of the population hold 
radical anti-Semitic views (radical being defined for those respondents scoring high on all dimensions: 
negative opinion on Jews, negative emotions attached to these opinions, and negative behaviors towards 
Jews) (Kovács, 2005).  (Notably, however, these rates of radical anti-Semitism are still below those views 
expressed in relation to the Roma.) Political anti-Semitism has recently surged ahead where it has been 
finding renewed expression amongst the next generation of radical right extremist groups. 
Over the years anti-Semitism has been an essential and formative element of Hungarian national 
self-understandings, with the Jew filling the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. Two hundred years of 
Jewish assimilation in Hungary, sometimes interpreted as a success story, sometimes as a failure, has 
now seem to arrive at a new phase. The Jews as a group will not be studied in detail, though references 
to the group as well as the phenomenon of anti-Semitism will be made when relevant, given the fact 
that the Jewish question has always been a crucial question in Hungary and continues to be clearly 
connected to broader issues of tolerance.
The Roma
A. History of toleration and exclusion 
Today, the ‘Roma question’ is the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary. One of the reasons the 
Roma question is distinctive is because the state always treated them as a distinct group, developing specific 
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policies exclusively targeting the Roma. These policies were also consistently assimilatory, with the aim 
of eliminating ‘differences/otherness’ of the Roma  (Liégeois, 1983). The 1993 Minorities Law signaled a 
new ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities.  The Law officially recognized cultural 
and ethnic difference, but it did little to resolve the ’Roma problem’. The recognition and emancipation 
of the Roma as a minority group did not and could not lead to sustained ethnic political mobilization 
or the fight for reversing the assimilatory trends of the past. Cultural difference continues to operate as a 
disadvantage rather than a source of pride. Prejudiced discourses have indeed become even more dominant 
and discrimination and segregation of the Roma is arguably greater now than during the communist regime.
The Gypsy/Roma population first arrived in Hungary during the 15th century. Another important 
wave of Gypsy/Roma migration, this time from Romania, occurred following the Turkish occupation 
of Hungary in the 16th century.  In the 18th century, the Empress Maria Theresa, followed later by her 
son Joseph II, introduced a series of policies intended to sedentarize this otherwise nomadic Gypsy/
Roma population. This was partly successful, although at a cost to the majority communities who 
relied on the Gypsy/Roma itinerant tradesmen for local goods and services. Part of the Gypsy/Roma 
population, was, however, settled (mainly by force) in villages where they could fill the niche of some 
missing trades (Gypsies/Roma thus became blacksmiths, brick makers, etc.). These new Gypsy/Roma 
communities were located on the edges of villages where they were unable to enjoy the basic enemies 
of village life. Linguistic assimilation gradually began around this time and by the 19th century the 
sedentarized communities had all lost their original languages.
From the beginning of the 19th century new waves of Gypsy/Roma migration began from 
Romania. These Roma became known as the Vlach Gypsies and spoke the Romany language. They 
were tradesmen, who, similar to their predecessors in Hungary, still travelled around the country selling 
goods and providing services. Another important group arriving from the east were the ‘Beas’ Gypsies 
who were not nomadic but instead settled in villages in the south of Hungary. They mainly worked 
with wood and spoke an archaic Romanian dialect.
According to the 1910 census, 0,6% of the population of 18 million was Gypsy/Roma. From 
the beginning of the 20th century, the living conditions for many Gypsy/Roma communities began 
to deteriorate as the demand for traditional trades waned. During WWII, the Roma were persecuted 
and ultimately deported, with tens of thousands murdered (on debates over figures, see Bársony and 
Daróczi, 2005; Karsai, 1992; Purcsi, 2004).
The Roma population in Hungary was politically emancipated at the end of WWII with the onset 
of communism. This emancipation, however, consistent with the communist ideology at the time, 
promoted the assimilation of all sub-national groups; it did not, therefore, translate into the recognition 
of the Roma as a cultural/ethnic/linguistic group. New policies were instituted in 1961 that amounted 
to forced assimilation. The Roma were viewed as a socially disadvantaged group with distinct cultural 
traits. Their social integration was to be achieved by suppressing all signs of cultural difference, which, 
in communist parlance, included somewhat vaguely the ‘Roma way of life’. The Roma were categorized 
into three groups: integrated Roma, Roma on the path to integration, and non-integrated Roma (a 
system of classification that still operates today). Integration was interpreted as acceptance of and 
adoption to the ‘Hungarian way of life’ and norms (Mezey, 1986; Kemény, 2005). 
The communists thus regarded and dealt with the ‘Roma question’ as a social problem. At the same 
time the Roma were viewed as a reserve of manpower to fulfill the regime’s industrial ambitions. Due to 
this (and alongside more generic communist goals of full employment), the majority of the Roma were 
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indeed employed as unskilled workers in these communist years. The state also had plans to resettle the 
majority of Roma who continued to live at the edges of towns and villages. This resettlement program, 
which began in the 1960s, however, resulted in numerous local conflicts. By the 1980s, though, most 
of these old colonies had disappeared, with their populations dispersed. This ultimately led to the 
next problem: the increasing concentration of Roma in poor urban areas and the emergence of new 
urban ghettos. The relatively high employment rates of Roma during the communist years ensured that 
rates of absolute poverty remained relatively low. The social distance separating the Roma from the 
majority population, however, did not decrease during this period. Nonetheless, linguistic assimilation 
continued to take place: in 1971, 71% of the Roma claimed Hungarian as their mother-tongue; this 
figure has more recently increased to 90% (Kemény, Janky and Lengyel, 2004; Kemény, 2005).
It was claimed during Communism that the Roma were fully tolerated and accepted into society. 
In reality, however, the Roma experienced very real and specific problems in housing, healthcare, 
education, and employment that were systematically ignored by a ‘colour blind’ state committed to a 
policy of assimilation. These policies did not eradicate difference, but cemented the marginal position 
of the Roma. The possibility for discussing these issues in public, and the need for a shift in approach, 
emerged only with the political and socio-economic restructuring of Hungary in the late 1980s. By 
then, because of the long standing inequalities they had endured, the Roma were the most vulnerable 
and also therefore the most affected population by the changes brought about during the transition to 
a market economy.  
With the regime change in 1989/1990 one million jobs were lost as a consequence of the economic 
transition and the restructuring of major industries. Unskilled manpower was made largely redundant 
resulting in the long-term unemployment of large numbers of Roma. The transition thus led to mass 
unemployment among the Roma: while in 1989, 67% of the Roma were still employed, by 2003 this 
number had dropped to 21% (Janky 2004) and 23% in 2005 (Kertesi, 2005). Since the changes, a 
second and now a third generation have grown up without ever entering the labor market. The poverty 
rate is five-ten times higher for Roma than it is for the majority population, and it has doubled in the 
last ten years. (It is important to note, however, that 60% of households living in deep poverty are not 
Roma [Ladányi–Szelényi, 2002; Spéder, 2002]). 
Neighbourhood and school segregation further exacerbates this marginalization of Roma. 
Discriminatory practices against them in employment, healthcare, and law enforcement have worsened, 
and segregation in schools and places of residence have also increased. The extent of Roma isolation in 
some of the poorest areas of Hungary has been so great that so-called “Roma Villages” have come into 
being without access to public transport or public services. Nearly three quarters of the Roma live in 
segregated areas (Kemény, 2005), with most of them trapped in the most deprived and unemployment 
stricken areas of the country. Steady rates of school segregation also contribute to the low educational 
level of the Roma population (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009). Despite policy measures aimed at curbing 
segregation, the situation is not improving. Life expectancy for Roma is seven years below the national 
average (Kemény and Janky, 2003, 2004).
B. Political representation and mobilization
The most important political institution guaranteeing political representation for minorities is the self-
government system, created by the 1993 Minorities Law. In 1994 there were 477 local Roma self-
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governments; by 2006, the number had increased to 1100. There are several Roma political parties 
representing different interests and political views in local self-government, but none have won 
representation at the national level. Roma politicians lack a significant power base in Hungary, not 
because they are not politically united (as some critics claim), but because the political system, like 
Hungarian society at large, continues to discriminate against Roma.  In 2006 and 2010, only four 
candidates of Roma origin were elected as MPs of different mainstream parties. Critics say, however, that 
the political representation of the Roma minority is still inadequate because the self-government system 
was tailored to meet the needs first of the national minorities and only then the Roma.9 The minority 
self-government system was designed to provide minorities with a degree of cultural autonomy, which 
is what national minorities were demanding. For the Roma, however, the greatest challenge they face 
is not whether they can nurture their cultural heritage or develop their particular ethnic identity, but 
rather whether and how they can integrate into the majority society, becoming equal, tolerated, non-
discriminated members with the same opportunities as others in society. The minority self-government 
system is therefore more of symbolic importance than any real politically practical consequence.
C. Toleration/exclusion today
No other group suffers from lower rates of acceptance and tolerance than the Roma. In spite of a few 
blips in the early 2000s, “it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative 
and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, the rejection of the Roma is at a very high level” (Enyedi, 
Fábián and Sik, 2005). Since then, increasingly open and hostile political discourse directed at the 
Roma has translated in part to declining rates of acceptance (Látlelet, 2008).
Attitudes towards ethnic/national/migrant groups in Hungary (scale of 100: 1 - the least accepted; 
100 - the most accepted)10
1995 2002 2006 2007 2009
Roma 25 32 29 25 24
Chinese 41 37 35 32 34
Arabs 35 36 36 33 36
Serbs 32 38 - 38 37
Romanians 32 36 46 38 37
Blacks 40 - 44 41 42
Jews 57 52 50 50 44
Germans/Swabs 55 57 55 56 60
9 Research has been done on the issue of the legitimacy andeffectiveness of minority self-governments (Csefkó 1999, Kállai 2003)
10 Reasearch conducted by András Kovács. Data collection by Median: http://www.median.hu/object.ad137cad-29f5-4fd8-8a3a-
b28531f9d8d7.ivy
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‘Non-acceptance’ is constructed by well-known stereotypes such as: ‘They do not want to integrate’, 
‘They do not deserve to be helped’, ‘They are thieves because it is in their blood’, etc.
Anti-Roma attitude scale  
Number of 
respondents
Agreed among 
the those who 
responded
Roma are mature enough to make decisions concerning their life 959 38
Roma should be given more assistance than the non-Roma 973 15
The country should provide the opportunity to Roma to study in their 
mother tongue 976 66
All problems of Roma would resolve if they finally started to work 976 90
The Roma should completely be separated from the rest of the society since 
they are incapable to cohabitate. 976 34
Roma should not hide their origin 937 80
The Roma should be taught to live in the same way as the Hungarians 979 79
It is good that there are still bars/discos where Roma are prohibited to enter 926 49
The increase of the number of the Roma population 943 73
Everyone has the right to take their children to schools where there are no 
Roma children 956 60
Roma have criminality in their blood 947 67
Source: Fábián-Sik 1996, 2006
The intensity of these stereotypes has also grown over time: more negative stereotypes are shared 
by a higher proportion of the population now than twenty years ago.
Rate of those who agree with the following statements on Roma (%) (Source: Median) 
1992 2001 2009
There are respectable Roma but most of them are not 88 89 82
Roma do not make any efforts to integrate into the society - 75 79
Roma should be forced to live as the rest of the society 67 76 79
Roma do not deserve assistance  49 58 61
Roma have criminality in their blood - - 58
Roma should be separated from the rest of the society 25 29 36
Roma cannot integrate because of discrimination - 34 33
The Hungarian government should do more for Roma 19 23 23
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The negative tendencies characterizing this picture of intolerance can partly be explained by the 
rise of the radical right in the last several years. However, as the data indicate, the non-acceptance of 
Roma is more widespread than this: along different dimensions 50-80% of the population display 
negative attitudes towards the Roma. Moreover, surveys also reveal that prejudiced attitudes are held 
from people on both sides of the political spectrum.
The recent rise of Jobbik as part of a more general shift to a increasingly radical and racist political 
discourse emerged following the ‘legitimacy crisis’ political scandal of 2006 (precipitated by the 
leaking of the prime minister admitting to lying in the build up to the elections earlier that year). 
This culminated with a series of on again, off again riots orchestrated and attended by an assortment 
of radical right groupings. Jobbik, although not the main organizer, benefited from this backlash and 
witnessed an increase in its support.  Their first big electoral victory came in 2009 when they sent 
three MPs to the European Parliament. Their next big success came in the Hungarian 2010 elections 
when they came in third, only slightly behind the previously governing socialists. The Magyar Gárda 
(Hungarian Guard), which established itself in 2007 as a ‘cultural NGO’, also has links to Jobbik.  Its 
main activities involve organizing uniformed marches through villages and towns with large Roma 
populations. The association was outlawed in 2008 but still continues to operate. 
This is all evidence of a general shift to a more radical political discourse (frequently echoed in the 
media). Jobbik has put the Roma back on the political and public agenda with their talk about ‘Gypsy 
criminality’, ‘parasites of the society’, and so forth. These and similar themes have found their way into 
the mainstream media, reproducing and in a sense legitimating them in the process.
3.1.2. Immigration trends
The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is one of the lowest in Europe (less than 2%, with the 
majority being ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries). These numbers are nevertheless on 
the rise (with non-EU nationals now making up 35-40% of all immigrants) (Kováts, 2010).
The first important wave of migration to Hungary started in the late 1980s still during the 
communist years across the tightly controlled borders of Romania. Most of these immigrants were 
ethnic Hungarians fleeing economic hardships and political persecution in Ceauşescu’s Romania. The 
early 1990s witnessed a second upsurge in ethnic Hungarian migration from Romania in response to 
continued economic stagnation but also following the outbreak of ethnic tensions in Romania (Sik, 
1990, 1996). The third wave of migration took place during the Yugoslav war, with ethnic Hungarians 
accompanied by many other nationalities from the former republics of the dissolving Yugoslavia. (Most 
of them, however, continued on to other EU countries). 
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The number of naturalized citizens between 1990 and 2005 can be seen in the graph below. The 
1992 spike presumably reflects the upsurge in migration from Romania following the ethnic 
violence there (see Kováts, 2005).
Given that the question of migration in general and transborder Hungarian migration in particular 
had been politically taboo in the communist years, it is not surprising there was a corresponding void 
in the area of migration policy. The 1993 Law on Minorities did not address immigrants, only national 
minority groups. Another 1993 law, however, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, was the first law 
to address immigration matters. The law decreed fairly restrictive paths to naturalization (with some 
benefits for ethnic Hungarians).
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the problems of immigration, civic participation of 
immigrants was not a relevant issue in contemporary Hungary, and so its direct legal regulation has been 
practically non-existent. Currently, NGOs are tasked with matters of immigrant and refugee inclusion 
(Sik and Tóth, 2000; Tóth, 2004). This hands off approach to immigrant incorporation is evidence by 
Hungary’s failure to sign the European Council’s Convention on the role of foreign nationalities in local 
politics (ETS. 144). Since their participation was not forbidden, however, migrants have in some cases 
participated in local elections (Sik and Zakariás, 2005; p. 16). One of the main reasons the state has 
not concentrated its efforts on immigrant integration is because it has been assumed that most migrants 
are ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries, for whom questions of integration are viewed as 
unproblematic. Research on the topic has nevertheless shown a sharp discrepancy between the political 
elite’s discourses on national unity and the discriminatory practices experienced by migrants on the 
ground (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005).
A marked shift in policy towards immigration occurred in 2002 when the then Fidesz government 
introduced its ‘Status Law’, a package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included 
the legal right to work in Hungary for three months per calendar year. Although the law did little to 
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facilitate immigration and settlement for ethnic Hungarians, it did open the door to legalized labour 
migration (which had previously been mostly undocumented). A far more significant breakthrough 
in immigration issues, however, came in 2007, when Romania joined the EU and Hungary decided 
to open up its employment market to workforce coming from Romania. Against all expectations and 
forecasts, studies show that these administrative changes did not lead to mass migration to Hungary 
(Hárs, 2003; Örkény, 2003a, 2003b; Feischmidt and Zakariás 2006; Sik and Simonovits, 2003). 
Within the above context, the new Dual Citizenship Law passed by the Fidesz government in May 
2010 can be perceived as more of a symbolic gesture than a law with immediate practical implications 
for the Hungarian economy (at least not in the case of ethnic Hungarians that live in countries that 
already joined the European Union.)
3.1.3. Attitudes towards immigrants
Attitude surveys (Dencső and Sik, n.d.) show that general levels of xenophobia are very high in Hungary 
(only Greece, Portugal and Estonia exhibit higher levels), despite low levels of immigration.
The rate of those refusing to receive the different ethnic groups arriving to Hungary (%) June 
2006 and February 2007 (Source:  TARKI 2006, 2007)
June 2006 February 2007
Ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries  4 4 
Arabs 82 87 
Chinese 79 81 
Russians 75 80 
Romanians 71 77 
Pirez (a non-existent group) 59 68 
According to another survey (TARKI 2009) 71% of the Hungarian population supports issuing 
residence permits to ethnic Hungarians, whereas only 15-19% support residency for other immigrants 
(Arabs, Israeli, Africans, Ukrainians, Serbs, Chinese, Roma from neighboring countries).
It is worth pointing out that the acceptance of ethnic Hungarians today at the expense of other 
immigrant groups was very different in the early 1990s. Survey data have shown that more than half of 
the ethnic Hungarian coming to Hungary felt that the receiving society was unfriendly towards them 
(Sik, 1990). The most common complaints were verbal insults and occasional discrimination (Fox, 
2007; Pulay, 2006; Feischmidt, 2005). These findings are in sharp contrast with survey data on attitudes 
toward co-ethnic Hungarians. More ethnographic research has shown that ethnic Hungarian migrants 
have been frequently blamed for the worsening labor market situation: ‘they take our jobs’. In the early 
and mid-1990s only 25% of the Hungarians agreed that ‘they should unconditionally be admitted into 
the country’. Research on attitudes toward foreigners shows that Hungarians in Hungary consistently 
regard Transylvanian Hungarians favorably and Romanians unfavorably (Fábián, 1998; pp. 158-60; 
Tóth and Turai, 2003 pp. 112, 115-16). Such findings, however, do not account for the way in which 
category membership shifts in sending and receiving contexts. It is not enough to say that Hungarians 
  c e n T e r  f o r  P o l i c y  s T u d i e s  P o l i c y  r e s e a r c H  r e P o r T s
24
in Hungarian like Transylvanian Hungarians and dislike Romanians. Hungarians in Hungary like 
Transylvanian Hungarians as long as they stay in Transylvania. The moment Transylvanian Hungarians 
cross the border as migrant workers they become ‘Romanian’ in the eyes of their hosts (Tóth and Turai, 
2003, pp. 108-10, 125).
The root of tolerance towards ethnic Hungarians comes from the traditional understanding of 
national identity and nationhood which claims ethnic/cultural kinship among all Hungarians who 
are scattered in different states of the Carpathian basin. Despite this political discourse, the ethnic 
Hungarians were perceived as ‘others’ when they started to come and live side by side with their co-
nationals in Hungary.
4 .  d e f i n i T i o n s  o f  To l e r a n c e  a n d  a c c e p Ta n c e / a c c o m m o d aT i o n  i n 
H u n g a r y
The concept of ‘tolerance’ as such is not explicitly defined or used in Hungary’s legislative frameworks. 
However, from an analytical point of view, it can be said that in Hungary different aspects of the notion 
can be captured by the term “liberal tolerance” (ACCEPT, 2009).11 Thus the constitution codifies and 
guarantees freedom of speech, media, and religion, the right to respect and dignity; equal treatment before 
the law; the right to equal education; and the protection of children and ethnic minorities. Many of the 
laws and policies that have been implemented in Hungary over the past two decades have contributed to 
the development of a framework of “egalitarian tolerance”12. These laws and initiatives have collectively 
aimed to create “institutional arrangements and public policies that fight negative stereotyping, promote 
positive inclusive identities and re-organize the public space in ways that accommodate diversity” 
(ACCEPT, 2009). While in principle these frameworks of ‘tolerance’ were developed in order to address 
the problems of all groups and individuals living in Hungary, in practice questions of ‘toleration’ most often 
came into focus in relation to the Roma and their integration into mainstream society. Thus, throughout 
this section of the report we will focus on the Roma. We will discuss how values of accommodation are 
understood and articulated in Hungary and how these values are codified into laws and policies. We will 
also consider how tolerance is reflected in institutional and everyday practices.
4.1. Values of the Hungarian regime of accommodation: legislative and policy frameworks
By the late 1990s, two main and divergent approaches had taken shape to accommodate Roma in 
mainstream society: the first approach focused on legislative solutions whilst the second concentrated 
on educational and welfare policies. The two approaches saw the root of the ‘Roma problem’ very 
differently and offered remedies that were therefore based on different assumptions of the cause of the 
problem. But as many experts have pointed out, the legislative and socio-economic solutions need not 
be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary (Szalai, 2000).
11 Liberal tolerance was defined in the ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7) as follows: “not 
interfering with practices or forms of life of a person even if one disapproves of them”.
12 ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7)
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4.1.1. Legislative frameworks
It was suggested by lawyers, NGOs, and human rights activists who pursued legislative solutions for 
the Roma that the problems they experienced existed because intolerance and informal discriminatory 
practices against them were deeply embedded in Hungarian society. As a result, the Roma, both as 
individuals but also as members of a minority group, had little or no protection under the law. Two 
parallel legislative frameworks were thereby developed, both of which attempted to codify norms of 
respect and recognition into Hungarian law:
a) Minority rights approach: This approach resulted in the Minorities Law of 1993, which was 
conceived, drafted, and implemented to protect the cultural rights of all ethnic and national minorities 
living in Hungary. The law explicitly named thirteen indigenous minority groups to benefit from 
the law by being given the right to form local and national minority self-governments. Minority self-
governments in turn could administer their own cultural institutions as well as offer their opinions 
on bills concerning minorities, including sending them back to parliament in cases where there were 
objections of a substantive nature. The law was modified in 2005 to create electoral lists, meaning that 
only those who registered as a member of a minority group before an election were able to vote for their 
respective minority self-government. This was welcomed by minorities given earlier perceived abuses 
of the system where non minorities were able to vote for minority representatives, resulting in minority 
self-governments without any minority members. Despite these modifications and improvements, the 
law has remained very controversial in Hungary. Many of its critics claim that the law is burdened 
by an inherent contradiction: while it protects cultures of numerically small and assimilated national 
minority groups, the less assimilated, numerically larger minority Roma are the least protected. 
Legislative efforts in this regard have thus been aimed primarily at addressing the needs of Hungary’s 
national minorities, not the Roma.  This is due in part to the Hungarian state’s desire to use the 
law to showcase its progressive minority treatment to the neighbouring countries and the EU and its 
institutions. The hope was that the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries would eventually benefit 
through the implementation of copycat laws in their own countries.
b) Human rights approach: This approach resulted in the Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunities 
Law of 2003, more commonly referred to as the ‘anti-discrimination law’. It was designed to sanction 
established discriminatory practices in everyday life (e.g. workplace, housing) and institutions (e.g. 
education, police, healthcare). This approach, by its very nature, focused on individuals, and claimed 
that all people, irrespective of their ethnic, racial, religious, sexual differences should be given equal 
opportunities and be treated with equal respect before the law. Since the law was passed, several human 
rights NGOs have successfully brought cases against schools, hospitals, and companies that discriminated 
against the Roma (data on such cases can be found in the archives of the Roma Press Agency and the 
Equal Treatment Authority13). During this same time period, the media became more cautious and 
nuanced in its reporting on Roma matters and avoided routinely linking the Roma with criminality. 
However, as pointed out in the introductory chapters, some of these gains have recently been lost: 
“Roma criminality” has once again become a catchphrase both in the media and political discourse.14 
13 http://www.rroma.hu/gss_rroma/alpha?do=3&pg=79&m132_act=1&st=4 and http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/ 
14 E.g. Amnesty International Report 2010 – Hungary, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,HUN,,4c03a82487,0.html 
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These successful cases were thus both few in number and often only of symbolic importance: the law 
failed to bring about significant improvement in the lives of the Roma. Discrimination against the 
Roma in state institutions, the labor market, and everyday interactions is still widespread; some analysts 
even claim that in the past few years the tendency has been toward a worsening of the situation (see for 
example studies by Havas-Liskó, 2006 and Kertesi-Kézdi, 2009 on increase in school segregation). And 
even at the time the legislation was passed critics argued that its basic framework, although important, 
did and could not adequately remedy the situation of the Roma in Hungary since their problems were 
not caused by discriminatory legislation but by informal and non-codified discriminatory practices 
which laws in themselves cannot eradicate (Stewart 2002). Lately, though, others have begun to argue 
that more recent legislation does at least implicitly discriminate against the Roma, or at the very least 
has discriminatory consequences for the Roma (Szira 2010).
4.1.2. Policy frameworks
Many researchers have argued that an ethnicized (Roma) underclass (e.g. Szelenyi and Ladanyi, 2001, 
2002) has been taking shape in recent years and have thus urged the state to speed up its efforts 
for the ‘inclusion’ of this group. Proponents of this perspective acknowledge the importance of anti-
discrimination and minority rights legislation, but at the same time argue that the problems facing the 
Roma minority have to be addressed not only through the ‘politics of recognition’ but also through the 
implementation of various measures and policies of social inclusion. Some social policy experts (e.g. 
Ferge, 2000, 2002) support the idea of universal social rights, claiming that without a universal system 
of such rights, the chance for increasing social inequalities is much higher. On the other hand, there 
have been sociologists (Szalai, 1992, 2005; Ladányi, 2009) who have been fiercely critical of the existing 
system for supporting not only the needy but the more privileged classes as well. Moreover, research on 
social policies shows that consecutive Hungarian governments have often promoted policies that benefit 
the middle and upper-middle classes while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid 
industry’ which socially excludes the poor (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas 2002; Szalai, 
2005). Data show that the lack of well-targeted social policies correlate with inequalities, poverty, and 
increasing social exclusion.
Besides debates over how comprehensive a system of social inclusion should be (whom to include, 
how, and for how long), there is also considerable confusion among policy makers, the general public, 
and politicians concerning whether color-blind or color-conscious approaches are preferable. In theory, 
social integration policies are (or ought to be) color-blind; they target the poor regardless of their skin 
color or cultural background. Many people belonging to the Roma minority are poor, and since the 
poor are targeted, they would automatically benefit from these policies. At the same time, successive 
governments in Hungary have liked to remind everyone of the efforts they have made to facilitate the 
integration of the Roma. This has meant that certain policy measures and the budgets attached to them 
were specifically labeled ‘Roma integration policies’ without the benefit of clear goals or budgetary 
allocations (as the State Audit Office wrote in its report in 2008). Therefore, it has never been entirely 
clear how much money has actually been spent on the Roma, or how many of them have actually 
benefited from these funds.
At the time pre-accession EU funds became available to promote integration in the labor market 
and educational institutions, policy making took a different tack. A clear requirement of these funds 
was that they had to explicitly target the Roma (thereby endorsing a color-conscious approach). This 
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approach was also carried over to the post-accession period when the National Development Plans 
required recipients of public money to specify how their programs would specifically affect the Roma. 
The state funded ‘Szechenyi Plan for small and medium sized enterprises, for example, was a color 
conscious economic policy that targeted the Roma to address EU directives regarding equality in labor 
markets. The plan offered financial incentives for businesses that employed Roma in disadvantaged 
regions of Hungary and gave financial support to small and medium size businesses that were started 
and run by Roma. An analysis of the program once in place, however, suggested that a significant 
portion of the plan’s budget was spent on non-Roma businesses that employed Roma only for the 
shortest period required, and only in low paying, marginal positions.
It is important to highlight, though, that a color conscious approach has not been adopted 
wholesale in Hungarian policy making. To the contrary: certain integration measures continue to be 
formulated as color-blind. One of the most crucial issues in this regard is school segregation. The most 
important steps that have been taken to reverse the processes that have led to segregation have all used 
social and not ethnic terminology to define the target group (their preferred terminology is the ‘socially 
disadvantaged’). The system today is thus a mixed one, containing both color-conscious and color-blind 
elements.
Twenty years of ‘state efforts’ to integrate the Roma have therefore not achieved the expected results 
as increasing poverty, inequality, and segregation tendencies reveal. Until pre-accession funds became 
available, successive governments developed more holistic integration strategies that attempted to 
simultaneously address all policy areas (labor market, education, housing, health care, social assistance) 
in a collective effort to foster integration. Later, when EU funds became available, new programs 
were developed specifically targeting the Roma. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Roma have 
benefitted less from these projects than the majority society (Kadét-Varró 2010). At the same time, there 
is continued social and political opposition to a number of integration and desegregation strategies and 
policies (e.g. school desegregation is typically hindered by resistance from local populations). This also 
contributes to the socio-economic degradation of the Roma in Hungary.
4.2. (In)Tolerance as institutional and everyday practice: the Roma
The complex processes that have contributed to the ongoing exclusion of the Roma are so deeply embedded 
both in institutional and everyday practices that it is almost impossible to disentangle them and discuss 
them individually. Most studies that describe labor market discrimination (Kertesi, 2005; Ladanyi and 
Szelenyi, 2001, 2002), school discrimination (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009), law enforcement discrimination 
(Helsinki 2008), and discrimination in the social security system (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and 
Darvas 2002; Szalai 1992, 2005) emphasize that the reasons for the failure of these policies are to be 
found at both macro and micro levels, and that institutional and individual discriminatory practices are 
strongly intertwined. Although there are many studies of these issues, two by Julia Szalai (1992, 2005) 
particularly exemplify the (in)tolerance of the present structures, demonstrating why the social security 
system is ill-suited to help Roma families in breaking the poverty cycle.
Szalai (1992) argues that the long-term impoverishment of the unemployed, pensioners, families 
with young children, and the Roma after 1989 was not the inevitable consequence of the transition 
from a planned to a market economy, but rather resulted from the ways in which the social security 
system was structured and organized during communism and immediately thereafter. In 1990 this 
system suddenly lost 27-28% of its operating budget since two deficit running departments (the health 
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care system and the pharmaceutical industry) were included in its budget. As a consequence, a conflict 
of interest arose between the long-term and the temporarily poor, while the two big ‘players’ (the 
healthcare system and the drug industry) succeeded in representing their interests against the interests 
of the ‘small and powerless consumers’ of the social security system. A second major change occurred 
also during the early 1990s: The social security system was decentralized and many of its functions were 
given over to local self-governments, where minority self-governments were thus put in charge of many 
issues related to ‘Roma poverty’. New funds to tackle these issues, however, were not allocated to these 
minority self-governments; the allocation of social aid remained the responsibility of municipalities. 
These contradictions provided few opportunities to redress problems of social exclusion. Szalai (2005) 
also shows through interviews with key social security stakeholders how many policies were subject to 
different local interpretations. Thus even well intentioned policies not infrequently resulted in practices 
that were discriminatory and even racist, with the Roma , the long-term unemployed, and families with 
many children benefitting little if at all. These bureaucrats were always able to find some law or policy 
to support their exclusionary decisions. Szalai (2005) concluded her study by placing the burden of 
responsibility for these abuses not only on the state bureaucrats directly involved, but more widely on 
society as a whole for the overly broad scope of this power.
5 .  c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r K s
An overview of the history of Hungarian nation building and of the policy and legislative frameworks 
that resulted from different approaches of the state to this issue has highlighted several important 
points. First, it is clear that ethnic/cultural and civic/political interpretations of nationhood in 
Hungary have existed concomitantly throughout the past 150 years of state building, and political 
elites have alternated between both to define the nation and formulate policies to protect or assimilate 
minorities. 
Second, Hungarian political elites in the past three decades have made significant efforts to 
adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international 
organisations. These obstacles to nationalism were strong enough so that even the radical and extremist 
political forces attempted to conform to them. 
Third, accession to the European Union has brought about many significant changes in 
Hungarian legislation and has been accompanied by the availability of new financial resources, part 
of which have reached the targeted minorities. This has led, on the one hand, to the rise of a policy 
discourse of toleration/acceptance and, on the other hand, to the improvement of certain aspects of 
the life of these minorities and immigrants (e.g. lessening of segregation in some school districts at 
least, and improved treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while EU has undoubtedly produced 
successes in these and other regards, Hungary at the same time has experienced an alarming rise in 
the activities and popularity of the radical right.  These tendencies paint a rather bleak picture of 
intolerance towards the Roma.
The question of the Roma is the most pressing question of tolerance in Hungary today.  As such, 
it will be the primary (if not at times exclusive) focus of our research.  Immigration to Hungary has 
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not generated the same sort of problems with respect to tolerance that the Roma experience.  This is 
in part because of the small scale of immigration to Hungary but also because the majority of these 
immigrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries.  Immigration thus does not present 
the same sorts of diversity challenges that the Roma question presents.  We will thus devote our energies 
to concentrating on the Roma question in the hopes of arriving at a more nuanced understanding of its 
various complexities and dimensions of the problem.
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